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     1Sometimes the acknowledgement is so slight as to amount to a slight. 
For example, Charles Freeman Jr., who was principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs in the U.S. Government from the Spring of 1986 to
the Spring of 1989, wrote an account of "The Angola/Namibia Accords" in
Foreign Affairs (Summer, 1989, pp. 126-141) in which the U.S. is not only
given the central role in the resolution of that region's problems (with the
U.S.S.R. as a behind-the-scenes partner), but the U.N. is accorded only a last
minute walk-in role in the final scene with no lines of its own.  In Freeman's
account, the U.N. served only an implementation role concerned with the final
procedural steps (p. 139).
CHAPTER 1
THE U.N. PERSPECTIVE
(A.)  THE U.N. ROLE
The U.N. is moribund.  This was the message of the early eighties.  Some
held a wake.  Some celebrated.  Others were more cautious.  While admitting
the patient was sick, they held a vigil over the sick bed and worked to
restore health to their middle-aged patient.
By the late eighties, the U.N. had miraculously revived.  Afghanistan,
Angola, Cambodia, Iran-Iraq, Namibia: in one regional conflict after another,
the U.N. was generally credited with playing an important role in reducing the
tensions and arriving at partial solutions.  Not that the U.N. played the
major role.  Nor could that role have been played without dramatic changes in
the positions and postures of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.  But the U.N. was
acknowledged as an important, independent player in international diplomacy.1
In 1990, the U.N. moved from an important to a major player.  For the
first time since it was formed, the Security Council began to play the role
conceived for it by its founders.  Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait
provided the catalyst, and the end of the Cold War allowed the original
mandate to be reborn.  The fact is the U.N. has had more lives than the
legendary cat.  Pronounced dead over and over again, somehow the U.N. refuses
to die.  Whether out of necessity or out of determination, the U.N. plays a
critical role in the international system, for both good and bad.
This volume takes up the story of the first major test of the U.N. in
its infancy.  The U.N. failed that test, and with that failure, the hopes of
many in the creative role of the U.N. died as well. 
"The international machinery failed.  The following pages will reveal
many of the reasons for this failure, reasons largely born of power politics,
2of jealousy, and of intrigue.  As a consequence, the Jews were forced to set
up their state by themselves with only the moral authority of the United
Nations partition resolution behind them, but with no assistance against armed
invasion." [Garcia Granados (1948) Preface vii]  
The U.N. failed, but not simply because of power politics and the
intrigue of its members. This book will argue that the UN itself failed; it
did not calculate with sufficient wisdom and foresight.  For example, when
Britain asked the UN to offer its advice on the problem of the Mandate, the UN
failed to obtain any prior commitment from Britain about how it would use that
advice or even that Britain would cooperate in implementing the advice
received. As another example, the United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) underestimated the relevance of the legal factor in
justifying the recommendations it made; UNSCOP also underplayed the future
role of law and the importance of a UN legal authority in disposing of the
question.  They overestimated the role America would or could play.  THe U.N.
did not adequately assess the importance of coercive force either as a threat
to the peaceful resolution to the conflict or, more importantly, as a
necessary ingredient to ensure that it would be resolved without war.  Though
the major reasons for the failure can be placed on the member states, the      
irresponsibility of Great Britain and the irresolution of the U.S., the U.N.
itself has a major share in the responsibility for its own failure.  The
analysis of the U.N. role in the partition of Palestine provides a relief
against which the current crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can (and
should) be viewed.
This volume is not based on a concern with restoring hope or reinforcing
pessimistic appraisals, but with analyzing the precise role of the U.N. in the
partition of Palestine.  The Arab-Zionist conflict seems no nearer a solution
43 years after the U.N. first entered the Palestinian fray.  It is too much to
expect this analysis to make a contribution to that ultimate resolution.  But
it may help us understand the role that the U.N. played and failed to play,
and, through that understanding, obtain a better grasp of the possible roles
for the U.N. in mediating conflicts.
If its role is suited to its capabilities, if the U.N. is not cast as a
Christ figure, a resurrected League of Nations to save the world from the
scourge of war, as it was in its infancy, but is seen as an important, even
3     2The panel consisted of scholars covering the British (Wm. Roger Louis),
American (Peter Grose), Soviet (Oles M. Smolawsky), Zionist (Michael J.
Cohen), and Arab (Waled Khalidi) dimensions of the 1945-1948 period leading up
to the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948.
     3The End of the Palestine Mandate, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Robert W.
Stookey, Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1986.
     4ibid, p. ix.
     5ibid, p. 146.
major player, then the U.N. may assist or serve a role in international
conflict, particularly those in the Middle East including the Iraq-Kuwait
crisis and possibly even the seemingly intractible Arab-Israeli conflict.
(B.) LACK OF ANALYSIS OF THE U.N. ROLE IN THE GENESIS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI      
     CONFLICT
But has the U.N. role in this most important arena of conflict not been
analyzed before?  More specifically, since the U.N. was the central focus of
the partition debate in 1947-48 leading up to the creation of Israel and the
first full-scale Arab-Israeli war, surely a systematic analysis of the U.N.
role in ending the British Mandate, in the birth of Israel and in the
subsequent war must have already been written.
If it had, an additional analysis from a different perspective at a new
time might be appropriate.  But in fact a scholary of the U.N. role has not
been written.
A panel at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in
San Francisco in December of 19832 presented papers on the period.  In the
volume3 resulting from that panel, the editors acknowledged that, "The United
Nations dimension of the problem does not form the subject of a separate
essay4, a point reiterated in the afterward by J.C. Hurewitz.  "Missing from
the discussion in this book is a systematic analysis of the role of the United
Nations in the termination of the mandate."5
There is no evidence of a systematic study of this specific period from
a U.N. perspective.  A few memoirs (Garcia-Granados, 1948; Lie, 1954; de
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Azcarate, 1961; Urquart, 1987)6 give personal accounts of the period, while
other volumes provide an overview of the whole conflict at the U.N. (Mezerik,
(ed.), 1967; Nuseibah, 1981; Howley, 1975)7 or an overview of the U.N. role in
mediating conflicts (Forsythe, 1968; UNITAR, 1970; Russell, 1976)8.  The
Institute of Palestine Studies has published its analysis of the Partition
Process (1967)9.  Only Jacob Robinson (1947)10 published a very early and very
important detailed analysis of the steps in the U.N. leading us to the
partition resolution.  This is scanty coverage when compared to the voluminous
writings examining the American, British, Zionist and Arab roles and their
interaction. None of those studies specifically provides a systematic analysis
of the U.N. role in the termination of the British Mandate, a study that is
particularly relevant and made easier in light of all the recent state-based
scholarship.
The selective list of those publications (listing only books and
excluding a much larger list of articles) provides a perspective on the
asymmetry of the material as well as a summary list of references without
which an analysis of the U.N. perspective could not be attempted.
On the American role, aside from extensive memoirs (Crum, 1947;
McDonald, 1951; the Forrestal Diaries, 1951; Phillips, 1952; Truman, 1956;
Jessup, 1974)11 and biographies (On Truman alone -- Daniels, 1950; Steinberg,
1962; Truman, M., 1973; Donovan, 1977 and Farrell 1980 -- as well as others
such as on Marshall, 1987)12 as well as the publications of the documents of
the period in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, we find
numerous scholarly studies of both the American government role (Hurewitz,
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1969; Wilson, 1979; Bain, 1979; Cohen, 1982 and Tschirgi, 1983)13 and that of
the American Jewish lobby (Snetsinger, 1974; Ganin, 1979; Grose, 1983;
Spiegel, 1985; Rubenberg, 1986)14.
Similarly, the British role has been recounted in numerous memoirs
(Crossman, 1947; Atlee, 1962; Montgomery, 1958; and Kirkbride, 1956; 1976)15,
in the biography of Ernest Bevin by Alan Bullock (1983)16, and in a number of
scholarly studies (Hurevitz, 1950; Zasloff, 1976; Wasserstein, 1978; Cohen,
1982; Abadi, 1982)17 but most importantly by Wm. Roger Louis' authoritative
studies, The British Empire in the Middle East (1984)18 in addition to the
volume already mentioned The End of The Palestine Mandate (1986)19 edited with
Robert Stookey, discussing the issue from all angles but the U.N. one.
Memoirs from the Zionist perspective are even more numerous (Weizmann,
1949; 1968; Begin, 1951; Elath, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1982; Goldmann, 1969; Ben
Gurion, 1971; Meir, 1975; Eban, 1977; Danin, 1987)20.  The biographies of Ben-
Gurion (Kurzman, 1983; Teveth, 1985)21 and Israeli Documents (Dec. 1947-May
1948) are available.  Aside from the general studies of Zionism as an ideology
and movement (Hertzberg, 1959; Halpern, 1961; Lacqueur, 1972; Avineri, 1984;
Rubinstein, 1984 and Avishai, 1985)22 and general histories (Sachar, 1976)23 we
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have Horowitz's (1953)24 early study, Michael Cohen's scholarly examination
(1982)25 and Flapan's (1987)26 critically revisionist views of the Zionist
perspective on partition published in English, supplemented by numerous
studies published only in Hebrew.
The Arab role, in addition to a large number of studies in Arabic,
include memoirs (Abdallah, 1950; 1954; Glubb, 1957; Turki, 1972)27 and a
biography of Musa Alami (1969)28, as well as the various publications of the
Arab Higher Committee for Palestine [including:  A Collection of Official
Documents Relating to the Palestine Question Submitted to the General Assembly
of the U.N. (1947), The Palestine Arab Case (1947); The Great Betrayal in the
U.N. (1948), Why the Arabs Entered Palestine (1948)]29.  Articles in the
Journal of Palestine Studies supplement this documentation.  The Middle East
Journal has also published extensively in this area.  We also have a number of
scholarly studies (Kadi, 1966; Jayigh,, 1966; Kimche, 1970; Khalidi, 1971;
Aruri, 1972; Zindaw, 1973; Quandt, Fuad and Lesch, 1973; Faddah, 1974; Kerr,
1975; Jineidini, 1976; Kayyali, 1976; Ben Dor, 1979; Migdal, 1980; Al-Hout,
1981; and Rubin, 1981)30 with some studies focusing on the Arab-Zionist
conflict per se (Peretz, 1958; Kurzman, 1970; Sinai and Sinai, 1972; Flapan,
1979; Peters, 1984; Ovendale, 1984; Caplan, 1986; Morris, 1988)31.
(C.)  THE U.N. AS A TOOL OF SOVEREIGN STATES
7     32Brian Urquart, A Life in Peace and War (New York:  Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1987) p. 108.
The assertion that a systematic analysis of the role of the U.N. is
important assumes that the U.N. is an independent player.  There are at least
two other interpretations of the U.N. role -- it is merely an agent of the
collective will of its members or it is just the instrument of its most
powerful members.  In the latter case, the issue of the role of the U.N.
merely requires an analysis of the motives, interests, actions, goals,
strategies, etc. of the great powers to determine the U.N. course of action or
at least, how the will of the majority was thwarted.  Was the U.N. only an
instrument of the collective will of the sovereign states who made up its
membership, particularly the sovereign will of the major powers who
constituted the Security Council?
The U.N. is nothing like a government.  It has no
sovereignty or power of sovereign decision-making.  It 
is an association of independent, sovereign states which 
depends for its effectiveness on the capacity of its 
members to agree and to cooperate, and on the ingenuity 
and dedication with which the Secretariat interprets and 
carries out their wishes.32
Since the capacity of governments to cooperate was quite limited, so was the
effectiveness of the U.N. according to Urquart.
But that was not how "the constituency of the highest good", as Brian
Urquart referred to the elite of international mandarins, saw the matter when
the U.N. took on the question of Palestine in a special session of the General
Assembly called in April of 1947. Quite the opposite. Rather than viewing the
UN as an instrument of very little effectiveness and no independent role
separate from that of its member states, 
 In 1947 we were naively optimistic as to what could 
       be done about this most complex and tragic of historical 
 dilemmas, where two ancient peoples were in an unequal 
 but deadly competition for a small but infinitely 
 significant piece of territory, a struggle made critical 
 by Hitler's annihilation of the Jews of Europe on the 
 one hand and the emergence of Arab nationalism on the 
 other.  Britain must be enabled to relinquish the 
 Mandate of Palestine with dignity.  The Jewish refugees 
 from World War II must be allowed to settle.  The 
 Palestinians' interests and rights must be protected.  
8     33Urquart, Op. cit., p. 113.
     34It was not quite true that Palestine was the reservoir of hope for most
Jews in the camps in Europe, at least in 1946.  Peter Grose noted in his
study, Israel in the Mind of America (1985) and in his terse summary in his
essay in the Louis-Stookey collection, The End of the Palestine Mandate
(1986), that a certain American relief worker informed Truman's White House
advisor, David Niles, (cf. the Niles papers, Brandeis University, Walthalm,
Mass, N.S. 195) that Earl G. Harrison, who wrote the famous report on Jewish
refugees in Europe that so influenced Truman, "could not have substantiated
his belief that Palestine was the sincere choice of the mass of Jewish
survivors." (p. 42, 1986)  There were contending forces in the camps, the
anti-Zionist Socialist bloc, for one, who called for a return to homes in
Poland.  Joseph J. Schwartz, the European director of the Joint Distribution
Committee, a non-Zionist organization dealing with Jewish refugees, was
assigned to accompany Harrison.  Schwartz, not by accident, was a committed
Zionist.  Not by accident, those who articulated their views to Harrison
wanted to go to Palestine.  However, the increasing oppression in Eastern
Europe, the renewal of programs in Poland and the failure of states to
resettle many of the Jews meant that by 1947 Palestine had become the only
hope for the vast majority of the Jews in the camps.
 A plan must be found to accommodate the conflicting 
 rights and demands of Arabs and Jews.  The international 
 community, through the United Nations, must restore 
 peace and execute the plan.  In our innocence, none of 
 these things seemed to us impossible.33
This is one explanation for the absence of a systematic analysis.  The
U.N. was an infant whose influence and moral authority stemmed from desperate
hope rather than years of proven experience. The U.N. took on a problem that
involved itself, on the one hand, in the first steps of dismantling the
largest empire the world has ever known, the British Empire, and, on the other
hand, in settling Jewish refugees who refused to be repatriated to their
European countries of origin, and, for most of whom, Palestine was their only
reservoir of hope34.  The U.N. took on the problem of getting a wounded giant
to lie down and, at the same time, allow individual remnants of the Holocaust
to stand up again and live with dignity.  If this was not enough, the conflict
involved two intense nationalisms struggling for sovereign control of a small
territory with great emotional and historical significance -- not just to the
immediate parties to the dispute but to the whole world. 
If a story of an inexperienced innocent, when it lacked any independent
sovereign power or authority to exact its will and when it was confronted with
9     35They were far from the largest group in absolute numbers.  For example,
there were 11-12 million Oestdeutsch, Germans from Eastern Europe, repatriated
to Germany after the war.  They had a homeland.  The number of Jews was
relatively small.  At the time of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, in
November of 1945, there were 100,000 Jews in refugee camps in Europe.  By the
beginning of 1947, the numbers had swollen to one quarter million, an increase
facilitated by the Soviet Union allowing Jews to enter the Western zones of
Germany and Austria in spite of their own objection in principle to both
emigration and Zionism.  In Oles M. Smolarsky's interpretation, the U.S.S.R.
was motivated to create problems for the West which had not seen fit to allow
the Soviet Union to participate in the resolution of the Palestine problem.
(c.f. Smolarsky, 1986, p. 65; see also Yaacov Rozi, Soviet Decision Making in
Practice:  the U.S.S.R. and Israel, 1947-1954 New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, 1980, p. 16).  The Jewish refugees were not foremost
because of their numbers.  The Jews were foremost because of the horrors of
the Holocaust that had destroyed one-third of Jewry and because, unlike other
nationalities, the Jews lacked a homeland to which they could flee.
one of the most complex intractable problems, is not sufficient to explain the
failure of the UN and the lack of a need for any detailed analysis of its
role, the circumstances in which the U.N. took up the issue were not
propitious either.
The U.N. was created in a world and at a time when Hitler's attempt to
create a great German empire had been defeated, when the British and French
Empires were in the first stages of dissolution to leave a number of sovereign
states as their legacy, when the Soviet empire was in the process of
consolidating its empire and the Americans had not yet decided which imperial
system outraged it the most as it spread its own economic hegemony.  As a
byproduct of the defeated Nazi failure to create an empire and the Soviet
initial successes, individuals were cast adrift who lacked the protection of
any sovereign state.  Foremost among those refugees were the Jews, who lacked
any national homeland.35
  In one corner were the Jewish refugees allied with their saviours, the
Zionists, with the promise of a homeland in Palestine.  In the other corner
were the Palestinian Arabs, intent on keeping the Jews out supported by Arab
sovereign states struggling to assert their own nascent identities as nation
states in the twentieth century.  In the self-interest of Great Britain, the
United Kingdom lined up with Arab interests but not with Arab nationalism. 
The United States entered the arena concerned with the refugees, antithetical
to political empires and sympathetic to nascent nationalism.  It ended up
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assuming the British mantel, but in the corner of the Zionists.  
The UN was cast into this cauldron of conflicting passions, interests
and rights. In retrospect it appears like a case of sacrificing an infant
international organization to the monster of competing nationalisms and world
powers.
(D.)  THE U.N. AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR
Though the U.N. took on the Palestinian problem in a very difficult
period, the U.N. did represent a new attempt to work with sovereign states to
develop an independent source of power, authority and influence which went
beyond the wills of individual sovereign states.  It may be the case that it
was not able to realize its independence during this infant period because of
the powers of sovereign states, but this does not mean it lacked the elements
of independence even though it was not a sovereign state.  If the U.K.
resisted this independence and effectively thwarted it, there was still an
independence to be thwarted.  If the U.S. tried to manipulate that will at
times in one direction and at times in another, and often failed, there was an
independent will subject to be influenced.  But if there was an independent
will, why didn't it express itself, given the obstinacy of the British and its
inability to force a concerted line of action with the Americans and given the
wild fluctuations in U.S. policy?  Why was the U.N. not able to forge ahead in
a creative way given the divisions among and within each of the great powers? 
Perhaps the vision of an independent will was just that -- a dream -- with no
basis in reality.  But an analysis -- not speculation -- is needed to answer
that question.
We must first ask what characteristics constitute an independent player
in the internaitonal realm.  Three criterion generally characterize such
independence:  an ability to bring force to bear on the issue in question, a
legal justification for the player to involve itself in the issue which gives
it authority, and some source of moral or material influence.  All three may
be present or only one of them.  The U.N. qualified as an independent player
on all three grounds.
On the Palestinian issue, the U.N. was unable and unwilling to use force
or even to threaten to use force to implement its decisions, but potentially
it could have used force.  More importantly, as the U.N. became involved in
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the dispute, an assumption was made by many members that the U.N. could and
would use force to implement its decisions with respect to the future of
Palestine.  That the U.N. did not resort to the use of force does not diminish
the fact that military force was a possible tool at its disposal.
Further, there was an argument that the U.N., as the successor to the
League of Nations, had a legal standing on the issue, though the nature of
that legal role was in dispute.  Literally, right up to the midnight hour in
the Middle East on May 14th, the U.N. attempted to ensure that the legal
standing devolved into a legal authority to determine the governance of
Palestine after the termination of the Mandate.  The attempt would fail; the
U.N. was unable to establish its legal authority in Palestine.  The potential
to translate a legal standing into a real authority, just like the potential
to use force, was never actualized.  On the other hand, a great deal of effort
was expended enhancing both.
But the most important expression of the U.N.'s independent status was
its primary asset as a moral influence, its inheritence as the repository of
the hopes of mankind in the post World War II period.  This moral authority
gave the U.N. an independent diplomatic role separate from its potential to
use force and any legal status it had in this area.  We shall see that it was
this moral authority that was most wastefully and tragically squandered in the
first great test case.
That the U.N. failed is undeniable.  Why it failed is another question.
One answer is that the U.N. had neither the power, authority or
influence to do the job.  As I have stated (and as I shall attempt to
document) this is not what I found to be the case.  The U.N. had the potential
to use military power; it did not.  Potentially, it had a legal standing; the
U.N. lost that standing.  But most of all, it had a moral authority.  Was that
moral authority simply inadequate given the irreconcilable differences of the
Arabs and Jews?  Could that moral influence have been translated into
authority for the U.N. and allowed the energies of its executive officers to
be better focussed and directed?
Was the U.N. naive in thinking it could do what the largest empire in
the history of the world had failed to do -- reconcile Jewish and Arab
interests in Palestine?  Did the U.N. know the risks were high?  Were they
12
     36Edward Buehrig (correctly I believe) suggests that the U.N. knew the
stakes were high, though Buehrig also believed the stakes were impossible for
the U.N. to overcome.  "The partition resolution -- suggestive of a peace
treaty without a war -- was an ambitious attempt to subject international
politics to peaceful change.  The stakes were high.  The outcome, whether
success or failure, was bound to have repercussions on the U.N.'s future.  As
it turned out, the confrontation of two peoples claiming the same homeland was
no more amenable to the discipline of the United Nations than to that of Great
Britain."  "The U.N., the U.S. and Palestine", Middle East Journal 33:4,1979.
impossible?36  Was the U.N. constitutionally incapable of accomplishing the
task in the first place?  Or, if it was capable of solving some problems, was
this one just too complex and intractable for such a weak and inexperienced
body?  These latter questions suggest innocence, structural weakness, and
objectively difficult goals -- all elements beyond the control of the U.N. 
But did the U.N. itself -- not just its individual members -- make errors that
destroyed whatever slim hope there might have been of avoiding a war between
the Jews and Arabs in Palestine?  Further, did the U.N. exacerbate the problem
in the process?
All these questions argue for a systematic study of the dissolution of
the British Mandate over Palestine from the perspective of the United Nations.
(E.)  THE POSSIBILITY OF AND NEED FOR A SYSTEMATIC STUDY
Is such a systematic study possible?  Numerous scholarly accounts
(already cited) have been written of the roles of the major players --
Britain, the United States, the Zionists and the Arabs.  Wouldn't a synthesis
of the results of all those studies, using a more neutral angle of vision,
provide that systematic study?  And then what could it say?  That the U.N.
started with good intentions when it took on the problem.  That the U.N. was
abandoned by the British, made dizzy by the zig zag diplomacy of the
Americans, propelled in one direction only by Soviet singlemindedness,
incapacitated by Arab intransigence and driven crazy by Zionist hectoring and
lobbying.
The studies of the roles of the major players indicates, at the very
least, that the story would not be so simple since none of the roles assumed
by the major players was so simple.  Secondly, since the U.N. was a prime
arena where the players took their positions in the drama terminating the
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British Mandate, the U.N. might indeed provide the best angle of vision to
assess their independent roles.
Thirdly, although the Americans, British, Arabs and Zionists were the
major players, representatives of smaller powers constituted UNSCOP -- the
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine -- which was set up by the
special session called in April 1947.  It was UNSCOP's report back to the Fall
session of the U.N. that led to the partition resolution.  Further, two thirds
of the votes of U.N. members were required to carry that resolution.  Once
passed, once the British abdicated and the Americans started to backtrack,it
was the inability of the Americans to carry with them the smaller countries
that doomed any reversal.
Thus, a systematic study of the role of the U.N. requires considering
the roles of the major players from a different angle of vision centred in New
York, rather than in Washington, London, Tel Aviv or Cairo.  Secondly, though
centred in New York, the periphery extends far beyond these major centres to
take in the roles of other states from Australia to Uruguay.
But it is not simply a matter of a new perspective and more players. 
There are also different issues.  If one focusses on the British role, there
is a concern with defining Britain's real interest in referring the problem to
the U.N.  What were British expectations?  Did Britain intend to hand the
problem over to the U.N. to solve, or did Britain simply want to show the U.N.
was no more capable of reaching a conclusion than Britain, and would have to
call on the British to bail them out?  From the U.N. perspective, the issue
becomes why the U.N. took on the problem and under what terms and conditions? 
What did U.N. officials and delegates know about the problem and its
difficulties?
The fascination with the American role focuses on how the U.S. came to
support partition.  Further, why, once the partition resolution was passed,
did the U.S. State Department begin the process of undermining partition
culminating in the Great Reversal, the March 19th speech proposing a
trusteeship?  To what extent was President Truman part of that process and to
what extent was he tricked by the State Department?  From the U.N.
perspective, the impact of the shifting U.S. role on the other states must
also be examined.  Not only must the effect of such a reversal on the military
option versus the negotiating option for the Zionists and Arabs be weighed,
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but the effect on U.N. morale must also be assessed.
A systematic study of the U.N. role in the termination of the British
Mandate in Palestine requires a different angle of vision, a consideration of
many more players in the drama and different questions.  Some of those
questions are simply complements to those asked when the roles of the British,
the Americas, the Arabs or the Zionists are considered.  But different
questions must also be asked, or, even when they are no different, they must
be given a different emphasis and form.
For example, the U.N., through the Security Council, was supposed to be
an independent force to ensure peace and security.  From the U.N. perspective,
was the employment of force appropriate or required in this case?  Since the
British abdicated and the Soviets seemed willing, the answer is said to be
simple - the U.S. was unwilling to allow force to be used lest Soviet troops
be allowed to enter the Middle East.  But we know from the studies of the U.S.
role that is was not so simple since consideration was given to employing the
forces of states other than the major powers to enforce the decision of the
General Assembly.  What pressures, if any, were put on the Americans and other
members of the Security Council to use its mandate to send in such a force? 
Were these efforts misplaced?
The potential military role of the U.N. must be examined.  So must its
legal jurisdiction.  This was the major issue for the U.N.  To what extent did
it have, would it have, a legal role to play?  Was the focus on the legal role
misdirected?  
Even if one ignores the potential military and legal role of the U.N.,
it did have a diplomatic function.  One must analyze how the U.N. performed
the diplomatic task.  What were the goals U.N. officials set themselves and
what methods did they use to accomplish those goals?
To what extent were their actions dictated by a sense of justice, or
were they just interested in using the U.N. to further their own national
agendas?  Was guilt over the Holocaust a major factor, as is widely believed,
or were U.N. officials motivated by empire building?  Or did they have a real
desire to strengthen the U.N. as an independent institution?  Were humanitrian
goals primary -- perhaps the peace and security of the world rather than
justice for the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs?
What motivated the other players at the U.N.?  A study of the U.N. role
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must necessarily include an examination of the results of the best studies on
the role of Zionists, Arabs, British, and Americans.  In the case of the
Zionists, the issue was whether their goal was simply to obtain a safe
homeland to which Jews could move without hindrance or limitation, or was the
Zionist goal a state, pure and simple, and the Jewish refugees a convenient
tool to achieve that end?  Or were both problems in reality inseparable?  And
if the Zionist's goal was a state, was it the partitioned state or the whole
of Palestine?
Were the Arabs, on the other hand, as intransigent as portrayed, or were
they open to compromise, but forces and circumstances pushed them into a
corner of intransigence?  Were they interested only in helping the
Palestinians achieve their own control over Palestine or were they privately
motivated to obtain control themselves, or, at the very least, prevent their
Arab rivals from obtaining control?
We already raised some of the questions about British motives in terms
of objectives, but there were other considerations -- the domestic economic
crises, the need for military bases, the desire to foster good will with the
Arab States given British oil interests in the Middle East.  Similarly, in the
case of the Americans, one can ask not only what different weights are to be
given to the various concerns in propelling American policy, but the
humanitarian and altruistic motives of Americans must also be factored into
the equation.
But the future can only be understood through the past.  The U.N. did
not arise ex nihilo.  It had a predecessor, the League of Nations.  It was the
League of Nations which awarded Britain the Mandate over Palestine, sanctioned
the Balfour Declaration and the principle of using Palestine as a homeland for
the Jews.  In the conflict between two nations struggling to establish their
political identities in the same territory, the League of Nations faced the
political issue of immigration but the U.N. had to deal with the more
desperate humanitarian issue of refugees.
Further, in the conflict between two nations struggling to establish
their political identities in the same territory, was assymetric.  One nation
sought a territorial base and a state to protect its members and give
expression to its national identity.  Another nation which constituted a
majority of the indigenous population was in the process of developing its
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national identity.  Further, both attempted to acquire sovereign control over
the territory in a context of Great Power domination governed by the fickle
requirements of national self-interest.  In another contextual level there was 
the creation and development of international bodies to mediate and ameliorate
those conflicts in the case of the U.N., protect the rights of individuals who
are the victims and cast-offs of such conflicts.  It is clear that behind the
conflict of the role of international agencies and sovereign states, behind
the conflict between competing nationalities, behind the conflict between the
sovereignty of the state and the rights of individuals there is a much more
fundamental issue rooted in the very nature of the nation-state itself.
(F.)  REFUGEES AND THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE NATION-STATE
The political order of the modern world is made up of nation-states.  A
primary function of a modern state is to protect the rights of individuals.37 
When a state does not or cannot protect that individual, and the individual
flees the territorial jurisdiction of a state without prior arrangements with
another state to act as his or her protector, that individual becomes a
refugee.
The political order of the modern world is made up of nation-states --
not just states, but states consisting of dominant nationalities and
minorities.  The state exists not only to protect the rights of individuals
but to express and protect the spirit of its predominant nationality -- or
nationalities in multinational states.38
Refugees are created when the state is unable or unwilling to protect
individuals who are members of the state and may, in fact, become the source
of greatest threat to the individuals.  States which have a collectivist
ideology are extremely prone to such persecution and to neglecting the
protection of individual rights.  But liberal states, particularly ones with a
strong collectivist factor in their own national destiny, may also presecute
individuals who are found or who find themselves outside the national factor. 
Refugees are also produced when the state, in its zeal to express the will of
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a dominant national group, fails to protect or actively persecutes members of
minority nationalities.  If the state expresses the national aspirations of a
dominant group at the expense of a minority nationality, not only will the
expression of the national sense of the minority be threatened, but the rights
of individuals may be as well.
Refugees who are the product of the latter type of conflict generally
flee en masse.  Refugees who flee because they are losers in an ideological
conflict about the identity of the state and the role of individuals within
it, and who fear persecution or, at least, the loss of the opportunity to
express their beliefs, may be termed ideological refugees.  The United Empire
Loyalists who fled the United States following the American War of
Independence were ideological refuges.  So too were the million or more
Russians who fled Russia when the Bolsheviks were victorious in 1917.  In some
cases (Afghanistan today) they flee to set up bases from which they can return
as victors in the ideological conflict.
In spite of the example of 5 million Afghan refugees -- the largest
single group of refugees -- most refugees are the product of the conflict over
the right of one nationality to prevail within the jurisdiction of a state. 
When the dominant nationality insists on exclusive predominance, then
minorities quickly become refugees.  This was true of the Armenian refugees
after the First World War.  This was true of the large exchange of Greek and
Turkish nationals following the war between Greece and Turkey in the 1920's,
even though many of the Greek nationals in Turkey no longer spoke Greek and
vice versa.  Over 10 million ethnic Germans were repatriated to Germany
following World War II even though many of them had bveen living for centuries
in Eastern Europe.
As long as new territories existed to which the refugees could flee and
settle, refugees did not create an international problem.  Following the First
World War, the opportunities to resettle in "new territories" became very
limited just as the rise of national identity and new states led to the
creation of more refugees.  The two factors, limited opportunities for places
to which to flee and more people fleeing, were, in fact, two sides of the same
coin -- the development of a system of nation-states that encompassed the
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     40The attempt of the Security Council to assume a role as a coercive
power failed.
globe.39
(G.)  REFUGEES AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
The supreme authority and agency responsible for the protection of
individuals is the sovereign state.  An international authority established to
protect refugees cannot challenge the sovereign authority of the state.  As
long as an international organization obeys that cardinal rule, it can offer
some degree of legal defence of the individual and appeal to sovereign states
to modify their absolute sovereignty to grant rights to refugees who end up
residing within their jurisdictions.  The international organization cannot
become, however, the primary instrument to guarantee the protection of that
individual since all individuals live in territories that are under the
jurisdiction of one state or another.
This does not make international agencies helpless.  In fact, they have
various instruments and means to become effective intervenors.  Though
international agencies lack coercive power,40 they do have the power that
creative ideas, good will and a detached non-partisan perspective can bring to
a conflict.  Though they lack formal jurisdictional legal authority that can
overrule the authority of a state, they can obtain some authoritativie
standing to protect refugees and, at the very least, serve as a moral if not
formal authority in advocacy on behalf of refugees.  Finally, international
agencies, using energy based on creative ideas and determination and moral
authority can influence a situation, particularly when backed by states which
enable the international agency to offer financial inducements to help deal
with a refugee problem.
The international authority can act as a moral conscience to galvanize
the efforts of states and individuals around the world to donate to efforts to
provide relief and help in the rehabilitation of refugees, and even serve, on
an interim basis, to assist in relief.
Given these three functions -- a creative and determined approach to
problem solving, legal assistance, and relief and rehabilitation -- an 
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     41Deborah Kaplan in The Arab Refugees:  An Abnormal Problem (Jerusalem: 
Rubin Mass, 1959) summarizes very well these restrictions on the role of
international agencies. (p. 113) "The basic principles...for the refugees." 
The United Nations, with the signing of the convention for the protection of
refugees was able to go further that the League, but the premises were the
same. (p. 127) "The identity of aims requiring protection".
international authority is not in a position to provide help which is of
indefinite duration.  Situations which become perpetual only reinforce an
image of impotence and not dynamic creativity.  Its legal and financial
assistance has to be interim or it risks losing support.41
An analysis of the U.N. role adds a different perspective, clutters the 
stage, raises different and complementary issues, examines different
motivational factors and completes the picture.
But it also brings into focus a critically important question -- the
long term significance of the U.N. involvement in this issue.  Typically, the
U.N. is widely credited (or blamed, as the case may be) in the public mind
(although not among most scholars) with being responsible for the birth of
Israel.  But it is also blamed for failing to bring about that birth in a
peaceful way.  Is the U.N. given credit and blame where it is due?  A careful
study may show that the real significance of U.N. involvement in Palestine is
not the extent of its responsibility for the birth of Israel and the tragedy
of war.  The real significance may well be the pattern set by the U.N. in its
involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  This would be the case even if we
downgrade the U.N. responsibility for the creation of Israel and the conflict
that took place.  For the U.N. has continued to play a role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict primarily through UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.  UNRWA is over 40 years old. 
It is the largest U.N. agency with over 17,000 employees.  My study of the
U.N. role in the dissolution of the British Mandate began with my study of
UNRWA and my sense that I needed to know much more about the U.N. role in the
Arab-Israeli conflict to understand how UNRWA got set up the way it did and
what its real purposes and goals were.
In other words, the creation of Israel and the first of the Arab-Israeli
wars were the immediate aftermaths of U.N. involvement, but the continuing
involvement of the U.N. with Palestinian refugees has been a long-term effect. 
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It is necessary to assess the significance of the U.N. role over the long term
and not just as a party to the events that took place at the time.  For it
will help us understand the future role of the U.N. and the manner in which it
chose to deal with the issue of Palestinian refugees.
 The same issues raised on the question of the Jewish refugees in Europe
after World War II would emerge again and again, but were subsequently applied
to the Palestinian refugees.  Were they to be repatriated or resettled?  Was
the consent of the state into which they were to be repatriated or resettled
required?  What choice was open to the refugees?  Which organizations were to
have jurisdiction and the control of funds for such resettlement or
repatriation?
(H.)  DILEMMAS AND PARADOXES
Behind these isssues are a number of problems that go to the heart of
the modern nation-state system.  One is central to the nation-state itself
which exists both to save individuals and to provide the means for the
majority nationality to express its character, an expression which can come at
the cost of individual and minority rights.  The state is the supreme
authority which is vested with the responsibility for protecting individuals
which are its members.  Yet the state is frequently the gratest threat to the
individual.  International agencies are then vested with the responsibility of
assisting individuals who are victims of the nation-state system, but the
international agency cannot infringe on the sovereign power of the nation-
state unless that nation-state directly threatens the international power
order.
Palestine was a critical case for the nation-state system and the role
of an international agency.  For the Arab views and Jewish views at the time
were fundamentally incompatible.  The Arabs insisted on the right of the
majority indigenous population in a territory, (that did not yet have the
sovereign authority of a state) to control the whole territory and the
sovereign authority that would emerge.  Further, most refused to even
recognize the Jews as a minority nationality.  The Jews, who prior to the
twentieth century, lacked any territorial base, insisted on being recognized
as a nation with a right to a territorial base in their ancient homeland. 
When they gained minority national status in that territory, they insisted on
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the right of their fellow nationals to return to that territory and demanded
the creation of a state in that territory which would guarantee the full
realization of that nationality.
Into that cauldron of fundamental paradoxes at the root of the nation-
state system and incompatible claims of nations in Palestine was tossed the
issue of European Jewish refugees.  They were not wanted, at that time, by
countries of resettlement in the West.  The Jewish refugees did not want to
return to their countries of origin which had treated them so brutally.  They
were rejected by the Arabs in Palestine because the influx of Jews threatened
Palestinian sovereign goals.  The Jewish refugees would only have a place to
go if the Jews in Palestine won some degree of sovereign authority.
The issue of the rights of individuals, the rights of nations to self-
realization, the conflicts between nations and the rights of refugees to a
state which would guarantee them protection, henceforth would be linked with
the outcome of the struggle for sovereign control over all or part of the
territory which was Palestine.  The U.N. could not deal with the Jewish
refugee problem until it dealt with sovereignty over the territory of
Palestine.  The way it handled the latter issue profoundly influenced the way
it became involved with the refugees who were the product of that struggle.
